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NETWORKED BATTLE COMMAND: IMPROVING JOINT FIRES FOR THE COMBATANT COMMANDER
"If we are to achieve decisive and rapid decisions superiority in the future, we have to take a hard look at our command and control. And one of the key areas … the most important program for the Army right now aside from the Soldier and fighting that last 400 meters is getting the network right … networks, architectures, comms systems, applications to make that happen." 1 -General Kevin P. Byrnes
The primary purpose of America's Armed forces is to fight and win the Nation's wars.
Throughout history, armed forces modify and adapt to the changing environment. Today, the United States Military is undergoing a change to account not only for current conditions but attempt to try and anticipate what the future environment will be. That current process is called transformation. Transformation is the creation of a force that is dominant across the full spectrum of military operations and is persuasive in peace, decisive in war, and preeminent in any form of conflict. 2 A critical part of transformation will be the establishment of a global information grid (GIG) to provide commanders with the ability to horizontally and vertically collaborate in order to see first, act first, and finish decisively. The concept for the GIG is described in the National Military Strategy, Joint Vision 2020, and the Joint Operating Concepts.
The GIG will provide the structure for a network that connects the services and improves joint battle command capabilities. The purpose of this paper is to address the issues confronting the implementation of the network and examine recommendations to facilitate a successful system.
The final result will provide networked battle command and enhance joint fires for the combatant commander.
Each service has developed a vision to support transformation. The Air Force Vision is to provide global vigilance, reach, and power to the nation by building the world's most respected air and space force. The Navy and Marine vision is to control the seas, assure access, and project power beyond the sea. They have the ability to change, adapt, and transform to meet any new threat to America. The Navy concept is a three-phased approach consisting of Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing, enabled by their version of networked battle command called FORCEnet. These concepts broaden naval power projection by leveraging enhanced command and control systems, communications, precision munitions, stealth, and endurance.
The Marines Strategy 21 will provide an enhanced strategic agility, operational reach, and the tactical flexibility to enable joint, allied, and coalition operations. They have proved during
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) that they have the ability to conduct land operations. The Army vision to support transformation is to provide a campaign quality army with Joint and Expeditionary capabilities. Soldiers will have a joint and expeditionary mindset and organized, trained, and equipped to go anywhere in the world, at any time, in any environment, against any adversary, to accomplish the assigned mission. 3 All service capabilities are being tested today as the United States Military is fully engaged throughout the world and its operations cover all the dimensions of the strategic security environment. This level of involvement will not diminish in the near future as the United States will continue to have global interests and be engaged with a variety of regional actors. The future force will be a joint force and will use all capabilities available. It is envisioned that U.S. forces will have superior intelligence and the power of information technologies to increase decision superiority, precision, and lethality of the force. In a globalizing world, military capable technology is available and potential adversaries may have the means to achieve parity or even superiority in niche technologies tailored to their military ambitions. 4 These missions will demand a flexible, reliable, and effective joint command and control architecture that provides the flexibility to maneuver, sustain, and protect U.S. forces across the battlefield in a timely manner. The command and control structure must be networked to ensure shared battlespace awareness.
BACKGROUND
The military continuously undergoes self-examination as it grapples with changes in the global environment and how the United States plans to employ the military to meet strategic goals. In the past century, the military has transformed itself several times to try and meet the changing strategic environment. These efforts have taken into account changes in the strategic environment, technology advances, personnel changes, and doctrine improvements. Since the Wright brothers had their historic first flight at Kitty Hawk, North Carolina, the Air Force has continuously improved air power to integrate air, space, and information operations. Activities such as the Berlin airlift, application of space and missile technology, mid-air refueling, high altitude reconnaissance and aviation pioneers such as Chuck Yeager shows the Air Force has been an innovative, adaptive force. The Navy has evolved from the 1986 blue-water, war-atsea maritime strategy to the 1992 littoral emphasis of from the sea, to the 1994 forward from the sea to its current broad strategy of fully integrating the Navy into global joint operations against regional and transnational dangers. 5 The army has continuously modified its division structure since its establishment in 1911 and the first permanent division assignment in 1917. 6 Initially, infantry and artillery coordination was not good enough to facilitate effective maneuver and artillery formations were not mobile enough to keep pace with infantry advances. Over the years the army adopted the triangular division, Pentomic Division, and the Triangular The Joint Command and Control (JC2) system will be the Department of Defense's principle command and control information network. JC2 will enable decision superiority via These command and control systems will be significant to the transformation effort and the establishment of an improved joint fires capability. The early establishment of joint fires capabilities and interoperability requirements will facilitate an interdependent joint force. The network will lead to an integrated joint fires capability.
ISSUES
There are numerous issues to overcome to ensure a successful network. Before the network specific issues can be overcome and discussed, service philosophy on requirements determination has to change. In the past, service requirements were determined at the tactical level and passed up to higher headquarters. This was a "bottom up" process. Training support managers worked with units in the field to determine what was needed and passed those to project managers who developed systems to meet these needs with prime contractors. This bottom up system led to systems being developed to meet tactical needs. However, these tactical systems did not meet the needs of higher headquarters and did not always have the ability to communicate with each other. Additionally, each service approached the requirement for command and control in different ways. Each service has its own particular requirements and has been unwilling or unable to work together to determine a joint solution. This has caused each service to have its own system and caused a lack of horizontal connectivity with the other services. Additionally, no efficiencies have been gained and money has been spent separately by the services in pursuit of the same objectives and goals. A true joint, networked battle command system has to be responsive and interoperable. The following areas are critical to achieve successful networked battle command.
The physical establishment of the network is the key to the future combat system and joint interdependence (See figure 1) . This includes the hardware and software supplied to units to provide the ability to connect to the network and link with other services and the resources available to those services. The concept is a soldier on the ground could acquire a target, place his call for fire in the network, an effects based solution would be determined, the delivery system notified, and the fires delivered for the shooter in a timely manner with minimum third party intervention. The network will provide the means for information to flow and collaboration to occur. This will include collaboration between units, services, and platforms. The network will also include on the move capabilities and appropriate band width to allow quick dissemination of data. Without the network, there will be shortcomings in the ability of the maneuver commander to accomplish his mission. An example of the current network failing was the initial movement and attack of United States Forces into Iraq. Current battle command systems were largely dependent on stable non-moving communications means. Tactical
Command Posts used fixed antennas to communicate with their higher headquarters. In the quick movement into Iraq, tactical units relied on tactical whip antennas and quickly outran the fixed communication structure. The primary means of communications became voice FM and limited AM radios. The new network has to provide a robust communication structure that has the ability to operate on the move and over greater distances.
FIGURE 1: NETWORK FIRES CONCEPT
The network will enhance our ability to achieve Joint Interdependence. America's traditional way of current war is combined arms warfare. Each service brings a combination of technologies and tools in each dimension-land, air, sea, and space-to generate a synergy of effects that creates overwhelming dilemmas for our opponents. Each service is developing capabilities that can influence land combat directly and they need to leverage every potential tool of speed, operational reach, and precision. By projecting coordinated combinations of force unhindered by distance and generally independent of terrain, we can achieve maximum effect for the Joint Force Commander without regard to the service of origin.
14 This integration and deconfliction is joint interdependence. Joint interdependence purposefully combines service capabilities to maximize their total complementary and reinforcing effects, while minimizing their relative vulnerabilities. Joint interdependence seeks to allow forces to depend on and use other services resources. The improvements in technology and communications has led to improvements in precision, lethality, and extended weapons range. The network will allow services to take advantage of information technologies, mobility, and firepower by combining those resources. However, without the network, joint interdependence cannot succeed. The network will permit the necessary coordination that is not possible today. Any discussion about joint interdependence must include discussions about the network. There is significant risk in assuming the network will be established and joint interdependence will be possible. The risk, prior to network establishment, is downsizing or eliminating capabilities currently organic and available today because another service will provide that capability. One example is reinforcing field artillery. If a maneuver company can link directly to air assets, there is a minimal need to have a large amount of artillery. Therefore, it can be removed from the force structure.
However, if the network does not exist and the company cannot talk with the aircraft, they could find themselves without connectivity to joint fires assets. This is what occurred in Afghanistan during Operation ANACONDA. United States forces were conducting operations in the Arma
Mountains and Shahikot Valley. They did not expect heavy contact and were told close air support would be available. However, upon reaching the landing zone, they found themselves in heavy contact. No artillery was available and mortars were out of range. The only fire support asset available was close air support and attack aviation. While the company was able to communicate with the attack aviation they did not have the communications means or abilities to communicate with the aircraft in order to provide the target location and clearance.
There were aircraft available, but the aircraft could not engage because they could not distinguish between friendly and enemy elements and had no one on the ground to provide terminal guidance. There must be the capability to communicate with other service platforms.
In this case the proper data elements could not be fed from the ground to the aircraft. The aircrafts link-16 system is not capable of communicating with most of the ground force communications means. This lack of interoperability denied needed fire support to the ground force.
In recent years, the United States and the world are evolving from the industrial age to the information age. In this information age, power is increasingly derived from information sharing, information access, and speed. The vast technological opportunities are available to friend and foe alike. 15 Developing capabilities must be leveraged to enable interdependent network-centric warfare. Network Centric warfare refers to a combination of emerging tactics, techniques, and technologies that a networked force employs to create a decisive warfighting advantage. 16 This will require the network to be interoperable with all command and control systems and develop comprehensive and redundant information networks. The services will need to agree on the data definition, protocols, and standards informing the design of those networks. Currently each service has a command and control system, but these systems do not provide robust horizontal connectivity. The requirements for future automated battle command systems are continuous operations over extended distances, blue force tracking, joint fires, and logistics connectivity.
Additionally, interagency, allies, and coalition partners must be able to operate on the system. Joint Forces Command leads the development of the JBMC2 capability which brings together the service's battle management programs to fit a common joint architecture and will be interoperable.
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Command and control systems will need to address levels of war. The requirements at the strategic level of war are different from the tactical level. The strategic level of war focuses primarily on command and control issues such as unit locations, collaboration, and interoperability with other services. The tactical level has similar requirements, but also the need to determine technical computations such as firing data of weapons systems. The vertical connectivity needs to allow for information to be passed higher to lower to higher. It has been a difficult task for one system to meet all the requirements from strategic to tactical. This will require our new systems to be flexible and scalable in the future. Part of the scalability is to load the modules needed for a workstation and not the whole program. Past systems have required that all modules be loaded and then work around those not needed.
The system will also need to allow filtering of data to help commander's span of control.
Systems are increasing the speed with which information can be disseminated and coordinated, allowing the possibility for commanders to adjust their plans. Technology can enhance human capabilities, but war remains more art than science. Battle Command is more important than battle management. There can be "perfect" knowledge with very "imperfect" understanding.
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Systems have to be able to be scalable and filter the information for the commander. With increased number of targeting and intelligence gathering systems such as UAVs, radar, and aircraft, battle staffs can quickly be overwhelmed. The enemy "red" picture is captured by many automatic sources, but these sources do not have robust automatic integration and deconfliction capabilities. The current system for designating and deconflicting the red picture is manual. An intelligence specialist has to analyze the data and input it into the system. This usually occurs at the operational level and the result is too little enemy data is of use to tactical commanders.
Another example is the current air radar integration system that brings together a multitude of ground and air based radar systems to create one coherent but imperfect air picture. Enemy forces can disappear from friendly sensors, but that does not mean they have departed the area. The numbers of targets acquired can grow to hundreds and thousands and the information processed from the sensors will compete with target nominations, fire missions, and other automated information exchanges. The result is information overload and network stoppages. Staffs will be challenged to make sense of the information being provided by their sensors. Planning will be iterative and collaborative rather than sequential and linear.
The networked battle command system that is developed will require building of trust in the system. There is much discussion about the network providing the means for the sensor (forward observer, infantryman, UAV, radar, other intelligence acquisition systems) to see a target, input the call for fire, and have that call for fire go into the network and the sensor receive the proper system to achieve the effects he desired. This capability exists today in the army's battle command system. A sensor to shooter link can be established and calls for fire can go directly to the shooter. Two issues must be resolved. The first is automated clearance of fires procedures. Today's systems only check against fire support coordination measures that have been input. The future system requirement is the ability to conduct an automated check on all friendly units operating in the area. This will require systems to be integrated using the network so that friendly unit locations are available to all fire support systems and platforms. This includes fixed wing aircraft having the ability to display ground forces in the cockpit and their fire control system conducting a check before engaging. The second issue is building trust in the system. Today, commanders will not allow a sensor to shooter link except in certain, highly controlled circumstances. There is not a lot of trust in the automated systems having all the required information so units resort to voice clearance procedures. The voice process is time consuming. For an efficient network, sensor to shooter links must be established and this will require the system to prove to commanders that it is trustworthy and correct. Additionally, the system must be adaptable to changing situations such as rules of engagement. Currently, So while automatic fires increase efficiency and speed in processing fire missions, the delivery of fires may not be as effective as the commander needs to achieve his intent or properly influence the battle.
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The acquisition system has to respond to unexpected technical breakthroughs. The current process cannot keep pace with the speed of technology advances. Technology in the military sphere is developing as rapidly as the changes reshaping the civilian sector. The combination of scientific advancement and globalization of commerce and communications have contributed to several trends that significantly affect U.S. defense strategy and planning.
20
The acquisition system currently cannot rapidly adapt to circumstances that were not foreseen.
During peacetime, acquisition is more about economy vice effectiveness. Services focus on preserving force structure and budgetary programs of record. Resource risk is spread across budget years and programs, including forces in the field. This will not suffice. There needs to be a balance in the way equipment is procured. The current acquisition system, Programs of Record, take years to determine requirements and go through the entire acquisition process.
The Advanced Field Artillery Automated Data System (AFATDS) has been in development since 1981 and is not completely fielded. The Maneuver Control System (MCS) was introduced in 1987 and still has not successfully met all the requirements in an operational test. These systems were developed using older technology and are trying to insert new technology as it is developed. However, technology advances are moving faster than systems can incorporate them under the current process. At the other end of the spectrum is Advanced Concept technology demonstrations (ACTDs). These programs make use of existing off the shelf hardware and software and use spiral development to accomplish the task. They can quickly bring capabilities to the combatant commander. However, ACTDs are not designed to become systems of record, but have their capabilities incorporated into current systems. There is usually no money in the ACTD development to do this. There needs to be a balance between the two in order to bring capability to the field to meet requirements and take quick advantage with advancing technology without sacrificing security. The current system has services conducting similar efforts, but not working together. This is wasting valuable resources that could be used to further development.
A significant risk factor in the implementation of the network is the proliferation of technology. There is worldwide availability of very low cost, very high quality, very powerful information technology. Most countries have access to similar technology that the United States has. This includes the ability to jam, collect, and spoof networks. Cheap, simple technology provides the capability for just about anyone to make cheap weapons and the means to deploy assessments, joint integration, and resources. 22 The JROC provides top down guidance in defining military capabilities requirements from a joint perspective. Under the JROC process, no service is allowed to develop a system without the JROC approval. This will keep the services focused in a common direction, work toward common goals, and support interdependence.
The organization that will take the lead is USJFCOM. USJFCOM's mission is to maximize the nation's future and present military capabilities by leading the transformation of joint forces through joint concept development and experimentation, identifying joint requirements, advancing interoperability, conducting joint training, and providing ready continental U.S. based forces and capabilities to support combatant commands. 23 with it. A training program needs to address those soldiers already in the field. They need to be trained on new systems in order to build up the expertise needed in each unit. One can go to a unit today and find one or two experts in any given system and no one else has the experience to operate the equipment. This must be addressed. Leaders must learn to empower our soldiers to be able to make decisions.
As the JROC approves requirements, the hardware and software to support the system will be developed. A prime consideration is how operators view systems. From a simplistic point of view, operators learn more quickly and are more accepting of automation that looks like and performs like their personal computers. A user looks for a "Windows-type" environment with internet access, chat capability, and collaboration tools. Additionally, the "box" should have a similar look and feel. Today's systems are very difficult to use and require extensive training.
Any new system will have to meet these needs and be capable of handling information requirements. The Army has the ABCS Good Enough process which is looking at fielding a common automated C2 system throughout the army. 26 It will be a top down developed system and attempt to take into account all the considerations previously discussed. This top down effort will lead to greater efficiencies and economies of scale.
The acquisition system will have to be modified to streamline its processes and find an efficient way to change with technology. Technology is changing and improving at a rate too fast to continue with current systems. The current weapons and C2 acquisition process takes too long. ACTDS produce quick results using emerging technologies and are not constrained by acquisition requirements. However, ACTDs may not meet all security requirements. The answer is an acquisition process that balances the needs between security, speed, economy, and quality.
While the network is being built and tested, the risk associated with this transformation process must be taken into account. To mitigate the risk of the network not meeting all requirements, units should maintain an organic fires capability. Ground maneuver commanders have always been able to count on their organic mortars, cannons, and rockets to provide responsive, all weather, 24/7 fire support capability. The dilemma is the discussion of the network and interdependence reducing the ground commander's reliance on organic fire support since he will have access to all fire support assets available to the network. The recommendation is to reduce the amount of future risk by maintaining a company's organic fire support capability and not reduce it until the network has proven itself reliable. Even when the network is established, there still exists a need to maintain organic fire support because there are times that an area fire weapon is needed and aircraft or ships may not be available. By removing organic fire support, it reduces the options a commander has to react to unforeseen circumstances. Colonel Robert Barry provides an in-depth assessment of the need for organic fires in the June-August 2004 Field Artillery Journal. His conclusion is ground combat requires responsive and timely indirect fires and the only way to guarantee that is to maintain an organic fires capability.
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SUMMARY
As the United States military continue the transformation process, the lessons of history provide lessons learned that need to be incorporated into the military's thinking. A top down approach will facilitate the services moving forward. Assigning JFCOM to lead and integrate this effort will provide a common bond. The JROC process will help ensure that services meet a common set of requirements and there will be precise guidance and control. Finally, as JFCOM and the JROC approve projects to meet the warfighters requirements, the acquisition system will adapt to provide the material solutions to meet the warfighters timelines. By following these recommendations and joining together in a joint effort, the network will become a reality and the result will be a robust, networked battle command system. The ability to link systems, platforms, and commanders will enhance joint fires for the combatant commander by providing the resources in an integrated fashion.
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